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Understanding Social Interactions: Evidence from the Classroom
* 
 
There is a large literature on social interactions and still little is known about the economic 
mechanisms leading to the high level of clustering in behavior that is so commonly observed 
in the data. In this paper we present a model in which agents are allowed to interact 
according to three distinct mechanisms, and we derive testable implications on the mean and 
the variance of the outcomes within and across groups. The empirical tests allow us to 
distinguish which mechanism(s) generates the observed patterns in the data. In our 
application we study the performance of undergraduate students and we find that social 
interactions take the form of mutual insurance. Such a result bears crucial policy implications 
for all those situations in which social interactions are important, from teamwork to class 
formation in education and co-authorship in academic research. 
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There is a ﬁrm belief that social interactions are important determinants of behavior in a variety
of contexts (Matthew O. Jackson 2008, Matthew O. Jackson 2009), yet very little is known
about the mechanics of such interactions. We propose and test models of social interactions
where risk-averse agents engage in production and can either (i) act in isolation, (ii) exploit pos-
sible complementarities (joint production), or (iii) mutually insure against idiosyncratic shocks
to time or productivity.
These models lend testable predictions in the ﬁrst and second moments of the distribution
of outcomes that allow us to distinguish them in empirical applications. In particular, while
all three mechanisms generate outcomes that are correlated within groups, they have different
implications for the average performance of group members.
We consider the model in which agents act in isolation, but may care about each others’ per-
formance (absent explicit social interactions), as a benchmark and we compare the implications
of joint production and insurance against it. We show that under joint production agents exploit
complementarities to achieve a higher level of output compared to the benchmark. In the mu-
tual full insurance scenario, any idiosyncratic difference in productivity or endowments across
agents is eliminated and the within-group comparisons that induced higher effort in the bench-
mark case disappears. As a consequence average output is lower in mutual (full) insurance than
in the benchmark case.
Despite the fact that our three mechanisms generate different predictions for average per-
formance, they all lead to clustering of outcomes within groups, which is what is commonly
referred to as peer effects or social interactions. Under decentralization (i.e. our benchmark
model) such a result rests on the assumption that agents evaluate their performance relative
to their peers, as in a tournament or status seeking model (Sherwin Rosen 1986, George A.
Akerlof 1997). Namely, the utility one enjoys out of a good performance declines if everyone
in the group does well. When agents produce jointly, the effort levels of all members of the
group enter each other’s production functions, thus inducing correlation in outcomes. Finally,
2in the mutual insurance setting the heterogeneity due to the idiosyncratic shocks is eliminated,
thus mechanically reducing the dispersion of outcomes within groups. Additionally, agents
also exert similar effort levels.
In our model agents choose their optimal level of effort conditional on the idiosyncratic
shock, while the choice of the interaction mechanism is made beforehand under uncertainty ac-
cording to a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function. We further assume
that there are costs associated to active social interactions, such as those required to produce
jointly or to engage in mutual insurance, and that such costs decrease as agents get to know
each other. Consistently with this framework, in our empirical application we examine how the
mean and the dispersion of outcomes evolve with the frequency of students’ meetings in the
classroom.
We test the implications of our model using data on undergraduate students at Bocconi
University, who are randomly assigned to teaching classes. Moreover, the random allocation
is repeated at the beginning of each academic year, so that the data exhibit a large degree of
exogenous variation (both cross-sectionally and over time) in the number of hours any two
students spend together in the same classroom. We exploit such exogenous variation to test
the implications of the interaction mechanisms considered in our theoretical discussion on the
mean and the variance of academic performance, both cross-sectionally and over time.
Our results indicate that mutual insurance is the economic mechanism that prevails in the
setting of our application. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that pairs of students who are allocated to the
same classes more often are characterized by less dispersed outcomes (both cross-sectionally
and over time) and lower average performance. Of the three mechanisms considered, insurance
is the only one capable of producing both of these results. As an additional test of insurance,
we also ﬁnd that the likelihood that the grade vectors of any two students cross decreases with
the number of hours they have been randomly allocated to the same classes. Such a result
is consistent with the mutual insurance mechanism, which preserves the ranking of agents’
outcomes across states and time.
To our knowledge, we are amongst the ﬁrst to explicitly investigate the economic nature of
3social interactions. The literature has been dominated by the search for suitable identiﬁcation
strategies to solve the many econometric hurdles of peer effects models (Charles F. Manski
1993, William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf 2001, Robert Mofﬁtt 2001) and has, so far,
devoted very little attention to understanding the different mechanisms that may generate such
effects.1 One notable exception is Jane Cooley (2009), who looks at a series of theoretical
models to derive the empirical functional forms of spill-overs across classmates. A different
approach is taken by Alberto Bisin, Andrea Moro & Giorgio Topa (2009), who discuss the
identiﬁcation of models of social interactions in the presence of multiple equilibria in a setting
where the economic mechanism is not directly investigated.
Although we test the implications of our models in the higher education environment, the
set-up and topics discussed in this paper are quite general and can be applied to many other ar-
eas. For example, in a production team the pressure exerted by the social group, either through
sanctionsorsimplerelativeutility(EugeneKandel&EdwardP.Lazear1992), mayalleviatethe
free-riding problem (Armen Alchian & Harold Desmetz 1972, Bengt Holmstrom 1982). Peer
pressure also explains the results of Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti (2009), where super-
market checkers’ performance improve when they are paired with high performance checkers.
Similarly, peer pressure seemsto providea consistent explanationalso forthe ﬁndings inArmin
Falk & Andrea Ichino (2006).2
A key difference between our theoretical approach and the typical model of team produc-
tion is the veriﬁability of (individual) output by the principal. Consistently with the empirical
application, in our model individual performance is veriﬁable, there are no (explicit) principals
nor informational asymmetries, however agents face an uncertain environment characterized
by random shocks to their time endowment or to their productivity. We believe that many pro-
duction problems resemble the one studied in this paper, from manufacturing to construction,
to most white collar jobs or coauthoring in academic research, where tenure decisions are made
1A recent wave of studies has approached the identiﬁcation problem with the use of network structures (Yann
Bramoull´ e, Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin 2009, Coralio Ballester, Antoni Calv´ o-Armengol & Yves Zenou
2006, Giacomo De Giorgi, Michele Pellizzari & Silvia Redaelli 2010).
2Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul (2009a) show how social connections affect productivity in
teams; while Patrick Bayer, Randi Pintoff & David Pozen (2009) provide evidence on the underlying nature of the
interaction in criminal behavior, suggesting a mechanism based on information or learning from others.
4at the individual level but the research activity is often carried out within groups of co-authors.
Without knowledge of the mechanics of social interactions it is often impossible to foresee
the effects of any policy intervention. A notable example is Scott Carrell, Bruce I. Sacerdote &
James E. West (2010), whose experiment on optimal sorting based on reduced form parameters
leads to unexpected and unintended results. In this view, the policy implications of our paper
are far-reaching. In our application, for example, if the aim of the policy maker is to maximize
average performance, one would design a mechanism of class allocation that prevents students
from meeting too frequently and/or introduces incentives to favor joint production and limits
the possibility of mutual insurance. In the case of teamwork, the incentives provided by the
principal need to account for the possible risk-sharing behavior among team members (Kandel
& Lazear 1992, Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul 2009a, Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay & Imran
Rasul 2009b).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents our three simple models of
social interactions (decentralization, joint production and mutual insurance); in Section 3 we
provide a description of the data used in Section 4 to carry out the empirical exercise and take
the predictions of the model to the test. Section 5 brieﬂy discusses alternative mechanisms and,
ﬁnally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we present a simple model of social interactions. For expositional purposes and
coherencewiththeempiricalapplication, wewillframethemodelintheeducationenvironment
and characterize the two agents as students and the production process as learning. Otherwise,
themodelcanbeappliedtoanysettingwithsocialinteractionsanditismeanttoparsimoniously
include the key features of several interaction mechanisms and to produce testable implications
that can be taken to the data.
Two risk averse, ex-ante identical students (i;j) exert costly effort to study, learn and ob-
tain a grade in academic tests or exams. Students value high academic performance. For
5simplicity, we assume that all tests are identical and we exclude the possibility that good per-
formance in one exam affects later performance.3 Students are hit by idiosyncratic shocks to
their endowment of time or to their productivity. Effort is chosen conditional on such shocks,
an assumption that, combined with the lack of interlinks across exams, implies that the choice
of effort is completely static.
Additionally, agents are allowed to interact according to three different mechanisms: (i)
decentralization or no explicit interactions (Section 2.1); (ii) joint production (Section 2.2);
(iii) mutual (full) insurance (Section 2.3). The choice of the mode of interaction is made before
observing the realizations of the shocks on the basis of a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility function. We further assume that active interactions, either in the form of joint
production or mutual insurance, are costly and that such costs decrease with how well students
know each other. The choice of the mode of interaction can be revised for each exam, for
example when the lectures begin.
In the remaining of this section, after describing brieﬂy the building blocks of the model,
we ﬁrst consider the solution of the static choice of optimal effort under the three mechanisms
that we consider (Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Then, in Section 2.4, we discuss the choice of the
mode of interaction. For simplicity, we analyze the non-strategic equilibrium of the model and
later, in Section 2.5, we present some extensions, including strategic behavior, multiple agents
and the social planner solution.
Before moving to the presentation of the model, it is worth emphasizing that the theoret-
ical analysis in this section is crucial for the purpose of uncovering the mechanics of social
interactions empirically. It is only by comparing the empirical implications derived from the
different models that we can identify the nature of the interactions in the data. A mere empirical
analysis without the derivation of a formal model would be incapable of producing any interest-
ing insight into the proposed mechanisms, as the standard regression of individual over group
performance would capture a feature that is common to all the economic mechanisms that we
consider, a similar argument would apply to a covariance analysis (Bryan S. Graham 2008).
3The model could easily accommodate interlinks across academic tests and the qualitative implications would
remain unchanged.
6Utility function. The utility of the generic student i depends positively on her academic
performance xi and negatively on effort ei. Moreover, we assume two additional properties of
the utility function. First, students are risk averse, a property that generates the desire to insure
against ﬂuctuations in academic performance. Second, the individual returns to xi (might)
decrease with one’s peer performance xj, i.e. the utility derived from an A is lower when
everyone gets an A. Alternative interpretations of this assumption are that students are averse
to equality or feel the peers’ pressure. We parameterize this relative utility effect with a loading
factor  2 (0;) that multiplies xj in i’s utility and vice versa. Thanks to this assumption
the model delivers within group correlation of the outcomes, even in the absence of explicit
interactions. Eventually, we will work with the following static utility function:4
Ui = ln(xi   xj)   ei (1)
Production/Learningfunction. Academicperformanceistheoutputofalearning/production
process, whose inputs are effort (possibly of both agents) and time ti, combined according to
the following technology:
xi = tig(ei;ej) (2)
While the level of effort is endogenously chosen by the student, time is an exogenous factor
subject to idiosyncratic shocks.5 In this interpretation, it is natural to assume that the two
4Thereisacorrespondingandsymmetricfunctionforagentj. Obviously,  isboundedaboveby toguarantee
that xi > xj and xj > xi. The choice of the particular (concave) utility function and the static framework are
not crucial for the testable implications produced.
5The production function of human capital might clearly include other inputs, such as teachers, resources,
class size and class composition, to name just a few. However, to keep the model simple and coherent with the
empirical application, we focus solely on effort and time. Adding additional inputs that are controlled by the
education institution would only complicate the notation, while in the empirical analysis we can fully control for
all these additional factors.
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; (marginal product of own effort larger than that of peer):(6)
When students do not cooperate, ej does not enter the production function for xi and for
notational convenience we label g(ei;0) as f(ei):
xi = tig(ei;0) = tif(ei) (7)
Shocks. Time is equal to a ﬁxed (maximum) endowment normalized to 1 and we allow for
a negative shock of size  to arrive with probability 1
2 and ti = 1 + ui. The shock hits only
one person in the fi;jg couple, so that with probability 1
2, we have ui = 0 and uj =   and
with probability 1
2 we have ui =   and uj = 0. This is equivalent to assuming that the shocks
to t are perfectly negatively correlated between the two agents. This stochastic endowment
process could be easily generalized and the results would remain qualitatively unchanged as
long as some degree of idiosyncratic variation is maintained. The most intuitive interpretation
of the shock is absence due to illness or random distraction in the classroom. Although one
could alternatively interpret t as some simple (stochastic) productivity parameter, we ﬁnd our
previous interpretation more convenient for expositional purposes.
2.1 Decentralized solution
When students act in isolation they maximize their utility taking each other’s behavior as given.
Even in this simple version, our model still has the potential to generate peer effects through
6We could also work with a more complicated function g(ei;ti;ej;tj), but the derivation becomes more te-
dious without any real additional insight. This is due to the fact that ti and tj are exogenous factors.
8relative utility (or equality aversion).
Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout the paper that agent i has a positive
shock (ti = 1) and j has a negative one (tj = 1   ):
Ui = ln[f(ei)   (1   )f(ej)]   ei (8)
Uj = ln[(1   )f(ej)   f(ei)]   ej (9)
Both agents choose their optimal effort level (under decentralization) eD
a ; 8a = i;j condi-













= (1   )f(e
D
j )   f(e
D
i ) (11)
Notice that equations 10 and 11 characterize a non-strategic equilibrium where agents do not
internalize the effect of their choices on their peers. In Section 2.5 we will return to this point.
Concavity in the utility function leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 The optimal effort level is not smaller for the student affected by the negative
shock: eD
i  eD
j , with equality holding when  = 0.
The proof is in Appendix A.
From proposition 1, it is immediate to derive the following, which is a direct consequence
of optimality:
Proposition 2 The performance/grade of the student hit by a positive shock is larger than
that obtained by the student with a negative shock, i.e. xD
i > xD
j , where xD
i and xD
j are the
equilibrium outcomes for agent i and j, respectively.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.








9Proposition 3 implies that, as the strength of the externalities in academic performance
(measured by ) increases, so does the mean outcome of the group E(x) = 1
2(xi + xj) since
everyone exerts higher effort.
Understanding the implications of relative utility on the dispersion of the outcomes is
slightly more complicated. We start using equations 10 and 11 to derive the following con-








As a ﬁrst approximation, note that when  ! 0, eD
i ! eD
j and CV (xD) ! 
1  > 0. As
 ! 1, CV (xD) ! 0. Thus, the more students care about their relative performance the lower
the dispersion in the outcomes. Intuitively, this result is generated by the concavity of the utility
function by which student j, who is hit by the negative shock, is placed on a steeper segment
of the utility function and, thus, cares more about performance. In fact, under some additional
assumptions about the production function f(), this result generalizes to the entire range of
feasible values of . In Appendix A we describe such additional assumptions in detail.7
The following proposition describes the effect of relative utility evaluations on the mean




@  0 for any admissible  2 [0;1);
(4.b) under the regularity conditions set out in Appendix A,
@CV (xD)
@  0 for any admissible
 2 [0;  ).
Proposition 4 shows that our simple model produces what is commonly termed peer effects also
in the absence of any active interaction, simply by virtue of relative utility. We will maintain
this case as the baseline scenario.
7A sufﬁcient condition for
@CV (x)




i;j be positive and sufﬁciently large in absolute value.
102.2 Joint production
In this section we modify the model under the assumption that students cooperate with each
other in the production process.8 This could also be interpreted as a model of co-authorship,
where each agent individually goes up for tenure or, alternatively, as a model of teamwork
where individual performance is veriﬁable, effort is observed and the agents contribute to each
other’s output (Alchian & Desmetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982, Kandel & Lazear 1992).
Combining the deﬁnition of the production function in equation 2 and the structure of the
shocks, we can deﬁne the following utility functions for agent i and agent j:
Ui = ln[g(ei;ej)   (1   )g(ej;ei)]   ei (13)
Uj = ln[(1   )g(ej;ei)   g(ei;ej)]   ej (14)
Like in the decentralization case, optimal effort is determined in a non-strategic setting after
observing the shocks according to the following ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization of





























i is the optimal effort of agent i under joint production and similarly for eC
j .
Using equations 15 and 16, it is relatively easy to derive the following proposition, where
eD




a for any a = fi;jg;
(5.b) Average performance in the joint production scenario is larger than in decentralization:
8The term cooperation might also suggest a situation where agents maximize the sum of each other’s utilities.
This is not how we solve the model in this section, although in Section 2.5 we consider precisely that type of
equilibrium as the planner’s solution.











i );(1   )f(eD
j )

are the equilibrium outcomes under joint production and decentralization, respectively.
The proof, in Appendix A, is trivial given that the level of effort is larger under joint pro-
duction than decentralization for both students, a result that rests exclusively on the existence
of complementarities in the production function (i.e.
@2g(ei;ej)
@ei@ej > 0).
Another interesting result of this model is described in the next proposition:
Proposition 6 (xC
i   xC
j ) < (xD
i   xD
j ), hence, given Proposition 5:a and 5:b, SD(xC) <
SD(xD) as well as CV (xC) < CV (xD).
The formal proof is in Appendix A but the intuition of the result in proposition 6 is straight-
forward: the concavity in the utility function implies that the agent hit by the negative shock
(j) enjoys higher marginal returns (utility) from improved outcomes, hence she increases effort
(relative to the decentralized equilibrium) more than her peer given the complementarity in the
production function.
In sum, this section shows that, under joint production, students’ outcomes are higher on
average and less dispersed than under decentralization.
2.3 Insurance
The third and last mechanism of interaction that we consider is mutual insurance against id-
iosyncratic shocks to time or productivity, e.g. health shocks or random distractions (John H.
Cochrane 1991, Barbara J. Mace 1991, Robert M. Townsend 1994). Under such circumstances
the student would ﬁnd herself in need of help to ﬁll the gap of important teaching material.
Given risk aversion, students have a desire to insure against such ﬂuctuations in their time en-
dowment (productivity) by exchanging notes or explanations of class material with classmates.
We model such an exchange as a transfer of time or productivity t between agents.
As already mentioned, we choose an extremely simple structure of the shocks but the im-
plications of the model are robust to alternative assumptions. As long as there is some idiosyn-
cratic variation in t, the main results are unchanged.
12For simplicity, we consider only the case of full insurance, where the students are perfectly
able to smooth away the shocks to their time endowments. Moreover, given that our agents
are ex-ante identical, we set identical Pareto weights. We also abstract from any issue of com-
mitment (Stephen Coate & Martin Ravallion 1993, Narayana R. Kocherlakota 1996, Fernando
Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann 2000, Ethan Ligon, Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall 2000)
but we will come back to this later in section 2.4. Notice, however, that even under limited
commitment, students can achieve full insurance for some parametrization of the primitives of
the model, for example when the punishment for deviating from a full insurance arrangement
is large enough. Ultimately, the testable implications of our model would remain qualitatively
unchanged also with partial insurance (Richard Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri & Ian Preston 2008).
Under these assumptions, agents in our model choose their effort levels exclusively on the
basis of the aggregate time endowment in the group. Hence, students solve the optimization
problem by simply splitting equally the difference in their endowments. Moreover, since in our
model the agents are ex-ante identical, the optimal level of effort is the same for both of them:
eI
i = eI
j = eI. Contrary to the previous cases (decentralization and joint production), in this
particular setting it does not matter whether effort is determined before or after observing the
shocks, apart from commitment issues. Formally,
Ui = Uj = U = ln[tf(e)   tf(e)]   e (17)








and equilibrium performance is:
x





Notice that , the parameter that measures reference utility considerations, does not appear
13in these ﬁrst order conditions. This is due to the fact that under (full) insurance agents are
identical both ex-ante and ex-post so that comparisons become meaningless. This has impor-
tant implications on optimal effort, which is necessarily lower under mutual insurance than
under decentralization (and, consequently, also compared to joint production) due to the fact
that the within-group comparisons that induced higher effort in the benchmark case have now
disappeared.





to 1. This is a consequence of full insurance, as the ratio of the marginal utilities depends only
on the Pareto weights, which, in our simple model, are identical for both agents. As such,






constant across states (and time).
This observation has a direct testable prediction: the vectors of performance outcomes of
any two agents who engage in mutual full insurance should never cross, given that individual
performance depends exclusively on the aggregate time endowment and the relative importance
of the student in the group (the Pareto weights).9 In Section 4, we take also this prediction to
the empirical test.
We can, then, prove the following, where eI is the optimal effort level, common to both





a for any a = fi;jg, which immediately implies E(xC) > E(xD) > E(xI);
(7.b) CV (xI) < CV (xC) < CV (xD).
Theproofisfairlystraightforwardandcan, onceagain, befoundinAppendixA.Theintuitionis
that, underfullinsurance, effortislowerduetothelackofwithin-groupheterogeneitythat, with
a reference based utility, generates the desire to excel. The result on dispersion is the combined
outcome of the reduced impact of the idiosyncratic shocks, mechanically generated by the
9Such prediction would be however incorrect if the agents had heterogenous risk preferences (Sam Schulloffer-
Wohl 2008, Maurizio Mazzocco & Shiv Saini 2009).
14insurance process, and the equalization of efforts among the agents. As we show in Appendix
A, the variance is reduced at a faster rate than the mean performance, indeed in our simpliﬁed
model with ex-ante homogeneous agents the (cross-sectional) variance of performance is equal
to zero.
2.4 Transition or the choice of the mechanism
In this section we discuss the choice of the mode of interaction, which is based on a standard
expectedutilityfunctiondeﬁnedoverthetwopossiblerealizationsoftheshocks, i.e. fui;ujg =
f0; g and fui;ujg = f ;0g. Notice that, since agents are ex-ante identical, they both share
the same expected utility and the resulting choice of the mechanism will be unanimous.
We also assume that active social interactions, such as those required to produce jointly or
to engage in mutual insurance, impose some utility cost and that such costs decrease with how
well agents know each other. First, consider joint production and assume that the ability to
cooperate depends on how well the students know each other, which is a positive function of
the time they spend together. We model this as a (utility) cost that assumes the following form
c(m)  0, where m is the number of times agents meet randomly and with
@c(m)
@m < 0. This
cost function incorporates the idea that agents must pay some initial cost for getting to know
each other. At some point the number of previous meetings is large enough to make the cost of
cooperating lower than its beneﬁts and students would, then, transit from the baseline scenario
of complete decentralization to the joint production state.
A similar argument applies to insurance, as it takes time to get to know someone to the
point that reciprocal monitoring and trust are sufﬁcient to engage in mutual insurance. More
formally, we describe the cost of insurance with a function h(m), with
@h(m)
@m < 0. The function
h(m) could also be interpreted as a punishment or sanction function that describes the utility
loss derived from deviating from the insurance scheme (Coate & Ravallion 1993). Under such
interpretation, the size of the punishment increases with the number of meetings, somehow
capturing the idea that defaulting on someone we know better is more painful or more difﬁcult.
Given that our agents are risk averse, they will have an incentive to renege on the insurance
15contract in the good state (t = 1) and, as such, the contract will have to be self enforcing or
incentive compatible (Coate & Ravallion 1993, Ligon, Thomas & Worrall 2000). However,
given the static nature of this simpliﬁed model, the only equilibrium would be to renege if the
sanction is low. As students meet more often, they either ﬁnd it harder to default on good
friends or they develop the ability to punish deviating behaviors more effectively, so that, even
under limited commitment, the full insurance allocation can be implemented for a sufﬁciently
high level of m.
Consistently with our empirical application, where students initially do not know each other
and are randomly allocated to teaching classes, we assume that decentralization requires no
costs and is the baseline scenario.
Students select the mechanism that is associated with the highest level of expected utility
as follows:























u= )   c(m) (22)
Expected utility under mutual insurance: E(U
I) = U(e
I)   h(m) (23)
where U(eD
u=0) is the utility computed at the optimal effort level in decentralization under the




U(eI)), with superscripts indicating the interaction mode and subscripts the values of the shock.
Recall than in the mutual insurance model optimal effort is independent of the shock.
The comparison of equations 21, 22 and 23 deﬁnes which mechanism governs the interac-
tions among the students. When m is sufﬁciently low, possibly zero, the costs associated with
joint production or mutual insurance are larger than the beneﬁts and students simply act in iso-
lation according to our benchmark model of decentralized behavior. As m increases, both c(m)
and h(m) decrease until, for a sufﬁciently high m, either joint production or mutual insurance
become the utility-maximizing mode of interaction.
The relative shape of the functions c(m) and h(m) deﬁnes which of the models, joint pro-
16duction or insurance, arises ﬁrst. In fact, although we do not model this situation explicitly, it
might very well be possible that, for some values of m, both joint production and mutual insur-
ance coexist. Moreover, while it is obvious that in the absence of costs both joint production
and mutual insurance would be preferred to decentralization, preferences over these last two
mechanisms depend on the functional forms as well as on the size of the shock.10
Ultimately, thetypeofmechanismatworkisanempiricalmatterandouranalysisinSection














< 0 ) Insurance is the prevailing mechanism.
The reduction in the (within-group) dispersion of performances as a function of the time spent
together indicates the existence of peer effects, while the relation between the number of meet-
ings and average performance in the group allows to distinguish between joint production and
insurance.
2.5 Extensions
In this section we brieﬂy discuss three possible extensions to the theoretical setting described
in the previous sections.
First, consider what happens if agents behave strategically, i.e. they internalize the effect
of their choice of effort on their peer’s optimal behavior (Yann Bramoull´ e & Rachel Kranton
2007b, Yann Bramoull´ e & Rachel Kranton 2007a). Here we only provide the intuition that
our main results will be maintained in such a modiﬁed model but in Section Appendix C.1 we
discuss this issue more formally.
Strategic behavior is motivated by two types of externality, one that arises from the refer-
ence point in the utility function and one from the complementarity in the production function.
10Joint production offers the advantage of exploiting the complementarities in the production function, hence
in the absence of costs it would be preferred to decentralization. Similarly, mutual insurance reduces the variance
of the outcomes and, given the concavity of the utility function, it dominates decentralization when h(m) = 0.
17As far as the reference point is concerned, higher effort from one of the agents induces higher
effort from the other, thus reducing one’s utility because the reference point moves up. Such
a mechanism leads to both agents exerting a lower level of effort in the strategic equilibrium
compared to the non-strategic solution. However, the form of the utility function remains the
same in all three interaction mechanisms that we consider (decentralization, joint production
and insurance), therefore it does not modify the implications on the distribution of the outcomes
across interactions models and within types of equilibrium, i.e. strategic versus non-strategic.
The second type of externality is generated by the complementarity in the production func-
tion and it only arises in the joint production model, as in all other cases agents produce in
isolation and no complementarity can arise. Under joint production higher effort from one of
the agents increases the productivity of the other, who will also increase effort, which in turn
improves one’s productivity.
Hence, in this framework there are two offsetting externalities: on the one hand, higher
effort from one’s peer raises the reference point, thus lowering utility; on the other hand, it
improves productivity. The overall effect, compared to the non-strategic equilibrium, depends
on the functional forms. Nevertheless, the externality in the utility function is common to all
mechanisms so that, when comparing the distributions of the outcomes across mechanisms
within the strategic framework, only the production externality matters. Hence, given that the
production externality induces higher effort in joint production, there is no complementarity
in the other two regimes, in a strategic equilibrium the implications on the mean outcome is
reinforced. The same holds for dispersion, as the agent hit by the negative shock beneﬁts more
from the complementarity than the other.
The formal strategic solution of our model is further complicated by issues of existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium, which both depend on functional form assumptions. Neverthe-
less, given that the equilibrium exists and is unique, the intuition provided in this section is
valid and our main results would be unchanged.
The next extension that we consider is a multiple-agents model, i.e. a model where groups
18are formed among more than just two students.11 In the decentralization mechanism, adding
extra agents to one’s group would simply lead to a different formula for the reference point
in the utility function with no further modiﬁcations. Under joint production, the production
function would have to be modiﬁed to incorporate all group members, however, as long as
all cross derivatives in such a modiﬁed production function are non-negative, our qualitative
implications would remain unchanged and the resulting model would simply be more complex
without further insights. Finally, the results that we derive in the baseline insurance model with
just two agents are still valid in a multi-agent framework, as long as the network’s shape and
informational structure remain unchanged. In fact, under such conditions, the marginal utilities
of all group members would still be equalized in the same way as in the dyad. Furthermore, in
a multiple-agents framework one might want to modify the cost functions for joint production
and insurance (c(m) and h(m)) to take into account the fact that active interaction with many
agents might be costly and that the beneﬁts might be decreasing so that the network has a
bounded size or spans the entire set.
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss a third modiﬁcation of our model in which the joint production
scenario is solved by maximizing the sum of the individual utilities (as in a planner problem).
The results derived in Section 2.3 (as well as the proofs of Appendix A) assume that, in the
joint production scenario, the two agents produce jointly but choose effort independently. An
alternative and equally plausible assumption consists in maximizing the (possibly weighted)
sum of the utilities of the agents, which is the case that we brieﬂy discuss here and more in
details in Appendix C.2.
We present this analysis with the help of simulations, since the set of necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions under this scenario are more cumbersome than those in the main text. For
ease of comparison we show the simulations for the three proposed mechanisms, where the
joint production model is solved by maximization of the sum of the agents’ utilities. In such a
framework some of our results depend on the speciﬁc functional form assumptions, however,
as we show in details in Section Appendix C.2 and as shown in the simulation of Figure C1,
11We still maintain the assumption of homogeneous agents. Allowing for heterogeneous agents introduces the
issue of endogenous group formation, thus making the model substantially more complicated.
19our main results are conﬁrmed for a relatively standard parametrization of the problem. Figure
C1 plots the average outcome and the dispersion of outcomes in the groups against the size of
the shock and it shows that the mean performance under full insurance is lower than that in
joint production and decentralization (no planner). Again conﬁrming the previous results, the
dispersion is lowest in full insurance.
The bottom panel of Figure C1 produces the ordering of expected utilities, for a given
parametrization of the problem. Depending on the nature of the shock (and costs) students
would want to move from decentralization to full insurance.
3 The data
In this section we describe the data we use in Section 4 to test the theoretical predictions of
our models. The data come from the administrative archives of Bocconi University, an insti-
tution of higher education located in Milan, Italy ((Giacomo De Giorgi, Michele Pellizzari &
William Gui Woolston 2010, De Giorgi, Pellizzari & Redaelli 2010)). The important feature of
these data for the purpose of our application is that students are (repeatedly) randomly assigned
to teaching classes for each of their compulsory courses.
More speciﬁcally, we will focus on two cohorts of students who ﬁrst enrolled at Bocconi
in the academic year 1999/00 and 2000/01.12 These students were offered 7 degree programs
(majors), however, only 3 of them were large enough to require the splitting of lectures into
more than one class: Economics, Management, Economics and Finance.13 The ofﬁcial duration
of all programs was 4 years and, during the ﬁrst two years, and for most of the third, all
students were required to take a ﬁxed sequence of compulsory courses. Afterwards students
could choose elective subjects, following some program-speciﬁc guidelines. In order to avoid
12Although we have access to records for all students enrolled since 1989 and until 2009, we cannot choose
a cohort that is too recent because some of the students might still be working towards the completion of their
degrees. For the earlier cohorts we do not have information on the class identiﬁers, which are essential for our
analysis. Moreover, Bocconi reformed the structure of its programs twice during the period covered by these data,
ﬁrst in 1999/00 and then 2001/02. Hence, to avoid comparing cohorts across different systems, we consider only
students enrolled in their ﬁrst year in 1999/00 and 2000/01.
13The other programs were Economics and Management of the Public Administration, Economics and Law,
Law, Economics and Management in Arts, Culture and Communication.
20issues of endogenous selection, we exclude all elective courses from our analysis ad we focus
exclusively on compulsory courses.
The compulsory curricula is summarized in Table 1, while more details are given in Table
B1 in Appendix B. The table reports the number of compulsory courses (columns 1, 3 and
5) and the total number of lecturing hours (columns 2, 4 and 6) for each degree program and
academic year. For example, Table 1 shows that students in Management take 8 compulsory
courses during their ﬁrst year for a total of 464 hours of lectures.
[TABLE 1]
The crucial institutional feature for our testing strategy is that students were allocated to
the teaching classes according to a completely random procedure.14 The randomization was
repeated at the beginning of each academic year, when each student was informed of her class
identiﬁer and was instructed to take all the lectures of the year in the class corresponding to
her assigned identiﬁer. Namely, students would take all the courses of the ﬁrst year with the
same random group of peers, then all the courses of the second year with a different random
group and so on. Elective courses, which we do not consider in our analysis, were usually much
smaller in size and could easily be taught in a single class.
The ﬁgures reported in Table 1 clearly show that students who were assigned to the same
class ended up physically sitting in the same classroom for a considerable amount of time, thus
suggesting that the random allocation process is an important determinant of the strength of
students’ interactions.
Students were allocated into several classes for the explicit purpose of maintaining ade-
quate class sizes and to allow teachers to interact with the students in a more direct way. The
yearly repetition of the random allocation was, instead, justiﬁed with the desire to encourage
interactions among students. Bocconi has followed attentively the rule of randomly allocating
14The terms class and lecture often have different meanings in different countries and sometimes also in dif-
ferent schools within the same country. In most British universities, for example, lecture indicates a teaching
session where an instructor - typically a full faculty member - presents the main material of the course. Classes
are instead practical sessions where a teacher assistant solves problem sets and applied exercises with the students.
At Bocconi there was no such distinction, meaning that the same randomly allocated groups were kept for both
regular lectures and applied classes. Hence, in the remainder of the paper we use the two terms interchangeably.
21students to teaching classes so as to avoid clustering of students in some classes. Moreover,
for organizational reasons, students allocated to a speciﬁc class were also taking most or all of
their courses in exactly the same classroom. Overall, there are 12 classes per academic year
(and cohort): 8 classes in Management, 2 in Economics and 2 in Economics&Finance. The
classes are approximately equal sized, although not exactly.15
[TABLE 2]
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics on the 2,406 students that we eventually con-
sider in our empirical exercise, broken down by degree program. The large majority of stu-
dents are enrolled in the Management program, which attracts over 70% of them. The Eco-
nomics program is chosen by about 10% of the students and the remaining 20% are in Eco-
nomics&Finance. There is a higher incidence of males (58.5%) than females (41.5%) in the
student body, with gender differences being more pronounced in the Economics and Eco-
nomics&Finance programs. The majority (68%) of students come from outside the province
of Milan, the site of Bocconi. We also have information on the students’ household income,
which is recorded in 4 brackets at the time of enrollment for the purpose of determining tuition
fees and eligibility for scholarships. About 22% of the students are in the highest of those
brackets (approximately above 140 thousands USD). Average admission test scores and high
school grades, normalized on a scale 0-100, suggest that the best students cluster in Economics
and Economics&Finance.
[FIGURE 1]
In Figure 1 we present evidence consistent with random allocation, as in De Giorgi, Pel-
lizzari & Woolston (2010) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari & Redaelli (2010). The ﬁgure compares
the distribution of some selected characteristics in the entire cohort and within the groups of
peers of a randomly selected student in each of the three initial academic years. Speciﬁcally,
the variables that we consider for the tests in Figure 1 are the entry test score (upper left graph),
15As discussed in De Giorgi, Pellizzari & Woolston (2010), variation in class size is generated by mere logistic
constraints, i.e. variation in the physical size of available classrooms.
22high school grade (upper right graph), the gender indicator (lower left graph), the indicator for
high income (lower middle graph) and the dummy for residence outside Milan (lower right
graph). As it is evident from the ﬁgure, the distributions all look very similar. Statistical tests
also conﬁrm such a visual impression. Table B2 in Appendix B reports Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests for the comparison of the distributions of the admission test scores in any possible pair of
classes and any possible academic year. In the vast majority of cases we cannot reject the null
of equality and only in 11 out of 180 statistics we can reject the null at the 10% level, so well
below 10% of the cases. We have produced similar tests also for the distribution of high school
grades as well as all the other characteristics considered in Figure 1, using tests of proportions
for those characteristics that take the form of simple dummy indicators (gender, high income
students and residence outside Milan). Results are not reported for brevity but are available
from the authors upon request.
IntheempiricalanalysisofSection4, weconsiderallpossiblepairsofstudentsandcompare
mean grades and mean absolute grade differences (as a measure of dispersion of outcomes
within the pair), both across pairs who are randomly allocated to the same classes more or
less often and for the same pair over academic years. The focus on student pairs allows us
to concentrate on the lowest possible level of group interaction and to directly compare our
results with the implications of the model, that is also presented in a two-agents setting. For
this purpose we construct all pairs of students who could possibly meet, i.e. all pairs of students
who are in the same degree program and enrollment cohort. Eventually, we construct a dataset
of over 800,000 pairs, whose descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3, it is here important to
clarify that the data used for the empirical analysis contain one observation per pair per period
so that if the pair i;j appears in the data the symmetric pair j;i does not. Speciﬁcally, since the
random allocation is performed within degree program and cohort, only students within degree
program and cohort cells can be allocated to the same class. Call Ncp the number of students
in cohort c and degree program p, then the number of non-symmetric pairs generated by those
students is
Ncd(Ncd 1)
2 . Table B3 in Appendix B shows the number of students in each cd cell
and the corresponding number of pairs.
23[TABLE 3]
All the descriptive statistics in Table 3 are consistent with the random allocation (within
degree programs and cohorts) and the descriptives of the student body from Table 2.16 The last
row of Table 3 reports the mean value of a dummy indicator for whether the students in the
pair are ever allocated to the same class and it shows that slightly less that 40% of the pairs
ever met. Given the size of the degree programs and the number of random classes in each of
them, this number varies considerably with a low 33% in Management and a much larger 87%
in Economics and Economics&Finance.
The repeated randomization adopted by Bocconi generates as a byproduct the fact that some
students met more often than others, a crucial feature for our empirical exercise in Section 4. In
Table 4 we describe the main variables that arise from such a repeated randomization process
together with our key outcomes at the level of the student pairs.
[TABLE 4]
The ﬁrst row of Table 4 reports the average number of courses any two students sit together
by degree program and academic year. It is important to emphasize that, since this is meant to
be an indicator of how many opportunities for interactions students have had, it is a cumulative
variable, i.e. it measures the number of courses together in the current and in the past years.
This is the reason why the number of courses together always increases from one year to the
next.17 On average two random students would have sat 1.2 courses together by the end of their
ﬁrst year, 2.3 by their second year and 3.5 by the third. Notice that these averages combine
pairs of students who never meet and others that meet repeatedly. Given the number of classes
and courses in the different majors the above statistics become larger in Economics and in
Economics&Finance, i.e. 10-11 courses by the third year.
16The comparison of Table 2 and Table 3, in fact, can also be interpreted as a randomization test. One could
derive most of the statistics in Table 3 from those in Table 2, using the number of classes in each program and the
size of each enrollment cohort (in each degree program).
17In the regression analysis of Section 4 this mechanical time effect is controlled for by a set of year and degree
program dummies, which we always include in the control set.
24Since each course is taught for a different number of hours, the number of times students in
the pair are randomly assigned to the same class deﬁnes the number of hours they end up sitting
together in the same classroom (in the current and in the previous years). The average students
pair spends approximately 70 hours together by the end of the ﬁrst year, 135 by the second
and over 200 by the third. Given the variation in the number of courses and their duration in
hours (see Table 1), these statistics vary considerably across degree programs, with students in
Economics and Economics&Finance enjoying a lot more opportunities for interactions.
We also describe the evolution of both our main outcomes: the average and the dispersion
of academic performance within groups and across academic years. Notice that our main ex-
planatory variable (i.e. hours together) varies only across academic years for the same pair of
student, hence we consider only one observation for each pair in each year. Consequently, we
compute the average grade of the pair over all the compulsory courses of each academic year.
As a measure of dispersion we consider the mean absolute grade difference, i.e. for each exam
in each academic year we compute the absolute value of the difference in the grades of the
students in the pair and we take the average of those absolute differences over all the courses
of each academic year.18 Table 4 shows the basic characteristics of these variables, broken
down by academic year and degree program. The average grade is similar across all programs
and years and ﬂuctuates around a mean of approximately 26/30 (B+), with a mean absolute
difference of about 3.5.19
The last row of Table 4 reports the means, by degree program and academic year, of the
crossing indicator that we use in Section 4 to test the crossing property (see Section 2.3). Such
an indicator is constructed by comparing the grade vectors of the two students in each pair in
each academic year and verifying whether such vectors cross (at any point). In other words,
18In computing both the mean grade and the absolute mean grade difference of the pair we weight courses by
their length, assigning a higher weight to longer courses, i.e. courses with more hours of lectures. For robust-
ness, we have replicated all our results using unweighted outcomes obtaining virtually identical estimates. Such
robustness checks are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
19In Italy, university exams are graded on a scale 0 to 30, with pass equal to 18. Such a peculiar grading scale
comes from historical legacy: while in primary, middle and high school students were graded by one teacher per
subject on a scale 0 to 10 (pass equal to 6), at university each exam was supposed to be evaluated by a commission
of three professors, each grading on the same 0-10 scale, the ﬁnal mark being the sum of these three. Hence, 18 is
pass and 30 is full marks. Apart from the scaling, the actual grading at Bocconi is performed as in the average US
or UK university.
25the crossing indicator is equal to zero if one student consistently outperforms (or ties) the other
in all the courses of the speciﬁc academic year. Otherwise, the grade vectors cross and the
indicator takes value 1. The probability of crossing, for any two students, ranges between 80%
and 88%, with the exception of the third year in the Economics program where it is equal to
68%.
For completeness, in Table 5 we present the full extent of variation in our key independent
variable, i.e. number of meetings or hours together. Given the academic structure of the cur-
ricula, the variation arises both between and within (over-time) programs. There are a number
of sources of variation for our independent variable, all arising from the repeated random allo-
cation in different teaching classes: variation across majors in a given year, as well as variation
between pairs (cross-sectional and over time) and within pairs overtime. In particular, in the
Management major about 65% of the possible pairs never meet, while those pairs who meet
in the ﬁrst and second year (1.4%) sit together for about 850 hours, the few who meet every
year (0.2%) end up spending over 1,300 hours together. Any two students in Economics are
quite likely to meet as there are only two classes. In fact only about 13% of the (potential)
pairs never meet, while those who meet in year 1 and 2 (12%) spend 880 hours in the same
classroom, those who always meet (12%) spend about 1,100 hours together. Consistently with
the random allocation mechanism and similar class sizes, the meeting probabilities in the Eco-
nomics&Finance program are very similar to those in Economics. One can also show that as
a result of the random allocation in two classes of similar sizes (Econ and Econ&Finance) the
distribution of meetings, i.e. the leftmost column in Table 5 should look pretty even and close
to 12-13%, which indeed is what we have in the data, an additional piece of evidence that is
consistent with a successful random allocation.
[TABLE 5]
264 Empirical Analysis
In this section we analyze how the mean and the dispersion of academic outcomes within
groups evolve as students spend more and more time together over the ﬁrst three years of their
academic tracks. Following our theoretical discussion in Section 2, the different mechanisms of
socialinteractionshave differentimplicationsfortherelationships betweennumberofmeetings















< 0 ) Insurance is the mechanism.
where m is a measure of the number of hours the pair of students spend together. Namely, as
the number of interactions increases, we expect the average grade to increase if joint production
is the prevailing mechanism, to decrease if it is insurance and to stay unchanged if the leading
model is decentralization. The implications for dispersion are less clear cut, as we simply
expect the dispersion of grades within pairs to decrease as the number of meeting or hours
spent together increases when the prevailing mechanism is either joint production or insurance
(or any combination of the two) and to remain unaffected if no transition takes place from
decentralization to any of the other models.20
We test these predictions in Table 6, where we report the results of the following regres-
sions:
yijcpt = 1 + 1mijt + 1t + 1p + 1c + uijcpt (24)
yijcpt = 2 + 2mijt + 2t + ij + eijcpt (25)
where yijcpt is, alternatively, the mean grade or the mean (absolute) grade difference or the
20If we allow  to be increasing in m, i.e. the relative importance of one’s peer performance increases in the
number of meetings, we have that
@E(x
D)
@m > 0 and
@V ar(x
D)
@m < 0, as shown in Proposition 4.
27crossing indicator for pair (i;j), in cohort c, degree program p in year t; mijt measures the
number of meetings or hours student i and j spent together on or before year t. Additionally,
we control for year, degree program and cohort effects: t, p, c respectively. Equation 25 is
a slightly different speciﬁcation of equation 24, where we include a pair ﬁxed effect ij, which
obviously also captures the degree program and cohort effects. uijcpt and vijcpt are random
error terms.
The computation of the correct standard errors for equations 24 and 25 is particularly com-
plicated and it requires to take proper account of three issues: (i) the panel dimension of the
data (recall that we use one observation for each pair in each academic year); (ii) the pairwise
structure of the observations and (iii) the semi-aggregate level of variation of our main regressor
(hours together, mijt).
We take care of the ﬁrst problem (the panel dimension) in equation 24 by applying the stan-
dard random effect transformation and in equation 25 by transforming the model in orthogonal
deviations.21 In the standard textbook panel model, such transformations eliminate any serial
correlation as well as any heteroskedasticity from the error term, so that the classic random or
ﬁxed effects estimators can be computed by simple ordinary least squares on the transformed
data.
We can then take into account the other issues by clustering the standard errors of the
transformed model. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the error term eijcpt includes three additional
components: a !i that induces serial correlation among all pairs where student i is a member,
a !j that induces serial correlation among all pairs with student j as a member and a  that is
21The standard random effect transformation subtracts from each variable in the model (both the dependent
and each of the regressors) its within mean scaled by the factor  = 1  
q
u
T+u. For example, the random-
effects transformed dependent variable is yijcpt   yijcp, where yijcp = T 1 PT
t=1 yijcp and T = 3 in our
application. Similarly for all the regressors. The estimates of  and u that we use for this transformation are
the usual Swamy-Arora, also used by the command xtreg in Stata (P. A. V. B. Swamy & S. S. Arora 1972). The
transformation in orthogonal deviations consists in taking all variables in the model (both the dependent and each
of the regressors) in differences from the within mean of all future values, scaling by a factor ct that guarantees
homoskedasticity (in the absence of other error components). For example, the dependent variable of equation
25 transformed in orthogonal deviations is
h






that in the model in orthogonal deviations the time dimension is reduced by one unit, which explains the different
number of observations in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 compared to columns 1 and 3 (and similarly in Table 7 and
Table 9).
28common to all pairs that share the same value of mijt.22 As long as these components are all
additive, the above transformations (random effects and orthogonal deviations) do not affect
the structure of the transformed error terms, which remain additive in the three components
with the same (qualitative) variance-covariance matrices.
Hence, we take proper account of the pairwise nature of our data by clustering the standard
errors of the ordinary least square estimates produced on the transformed models at the level
of each individual student (i.e student i and student j in the pair). Additionally, since our main
regressor of interest (mijt) varies at a more aggregated level that the student pair (i.e. all pairs
whose members are assigned to the same classes in current and previous years are associated to
the same value of mijt) we face a standard Moulton problem (Brent R. Moulton 1990) and we
further cluster the standard errors along a third dimension that corresponds to the exact cells of
variation in mijt (such cells of variation are those shown in Table 5). Technically, we perform
such a three-level clustering using the procedure described in Colin A. Cameron, Douglas M.
Miller & Jonah B. Gelbach (2010).
The identiﬁcation of the parameters in equations 24 and 25 is straightforward, given that the
right hand side variable of interest (mijt) is generated exclusively by the random allocation pro-
cess, hence it is fully exogenous. Consistently with this interpretation, we obtain very similar
estimates across the two speciﬁcations, although including the pair ﬁxed effect ij substantially
improves efﬁciency.
Obviously, our measure of the strength of social interactions (mijt) does not necessarily
represent the true number of hours any two students spend together, either studying or engag-
ing in other social activities. If we were able to observe such true measure of time together,
we could use it in equations 24 and 25 instead of mijt. However, such a measure would be en-
dogenous, as people may choose to spend more time with some classmates for reasons that are
connected to academic performance. Hence, we could use mijt as an instrument for real time
together. Then, our results can be interpreted as the reduced form estimates of this hypothetical
22In order to simplify the notation, we omit to specify a subscript for  as it is deﬁned across the cells of
variation of mijt (those in Table 5) which are a complex combination of the students-degree-year dimensions of
the data.
29IV framework.
Once again, we expect the effect of hours together on the pair’s average performance (i.e
s for s = 1;2) to be positive or negative depending on whether the prevailing mechanism
is joint production or insurance, respectively. Our model does not exclude the possibility that
both mechanisms operate simultaneously, so that we are really only able to test which one
dominates.
[TABLE 6]
The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 we show
the estimates of equations 24 and 25 with the mean grade of the pair as a dependent variable.
For ease of interpretation both the dependent and the explanatory variables in these regressions
are normalized within degree program and academic year, so that the estimated effects can be
readilyinterpretedintermsofstandarddeviations. Namely, aonestandarddeviationincreasein
the number of hours together (approximately 240 hours) decreases mean performance by 2.2%
to 2.7% of a standard deviation, corresponding to almost 0.05 grade points. It is also interesting
to compare the average performance of pairs of students who are always assigned to the same
class for all the three years of their track and pairs of students who are never assigned to the
same class. These two types of student pairs are approximately 6.3 standard deviations apart in
terms of hours together, hence their mean grades are 17% of a standard deviation apart in favor
of the pair who never met, corresponding to almost 0.3 of a grade point. Consistently with the
random nature of mijt, including pair ﬁxed effects in the speciﬁcation of the model only affects
the coefﬁcients marginally, while it substantially improves the precision of the estimates.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 we report the estimates of equations 24 and 25 with our
measure of grade dispersion as a dependent variable, i.e. the mean absolute grade difference
of all the exams in each academic year. Results indicate that a one standard deviation increase
in the number of hours together (approximately 240 hours) reduces the mean absolute grade
difference by 1.2% of a standard deviation, corresponding to almost 0.02 grade points. The
comparison of pairs at the extreme ends of the hours distribution indicates that those who
30are consistently assigned to the same class have a mean absolute grade difference lower by
approximately 7.6% of a standard deviation or 0.11 grade points compared to those who never
sit courses together.
While the negative relationship between dispersion in performance and the number of hours
students spend together would be consistent with both insurance and joint production (or a
combination of the two), the only mechanism that can rationalize the decline in average perfor-
mance is insurance.
Asdiscussedinthetheoreticalsection, anadditionaltesttoassesstherelevanceofinsurance
motives relies on the time-series properties of students’ performances, i.e. on whether students’
grades in a pair cross each other. The logic of this crossing property is the following: consider
a pair of students who perfectly share risk by insuring each other (full insurance), then they
always exert the same level of effort, hence their outcomes should be either always identical,
in case of homogenous agents (with the same Pareto weights), or never cross if agents are
heterogeneous. Crossing outcomes are a signal of less than full insurance. This result has been
shown in Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) and essentially restates that under full insurance
the ratio of marginal utilities between any two agents is always constant and equal to the inverse
of the ratio of the Pareto weights. Similar tests are produced in Tullio Jappelli & Luigi Pistaferri
(2006) and Mazzocco & Saini (2009) in the consumption literature.
Inourapplication, weexpectstudentstoinsuremoreandmoreastheyspendmoreandmore
time together, eventually approaching full insurance (see Section 2.4). We test this prediction
by estimating equations 24 and 25 with the crossing indicator on the left hand side (linear
probability model). The crossing indicator is a simple dummy variable equal to 1 if the vectors
of exam grades of student i and j ever cross over the entire series of compulsory courses taken
during year t. The results are reported in Table 7.
[TABLE 7]
Results show that the likelihood of crossing decreases with the number of hours spent to-
gether and we take this as further evidence consistent with the insurance mechanism. Once
31again, the estimates are signiﬁcant at conventional statistical levels only when conditioning on
pair ﬁxed effects (column 2). The magnitude of the effect is such that a one standard deviation
increase in the number of hours together reduces the likelihood of crossing by 0.4 percentage
points or 1.1% of a standard deviation. Alternatively, one can look at the difference between
pairs of students who are always in the same class and pairs who are never in the same class,
the latter being 2.5 percentage points more likely to cross their grades.
4.1 Further Evidence
A ﬁrst simple robustness check of our results consists in investigating whether, for any spurious
reasons, future classmates appear to be related in terms of academic outcomes. If that were to
happen, our approach would be falsiﬁed from the start, as in none of our model we predict a
relation between outcomes of students who have not met yet. In this light, we run a series of
placebo regressions where we limit our sample to the ﬁrst academic year (i.e. one observation
for each pair) and we regress such outcome on an indicator for whether the pair will ever meet
in the future two years. Results are reported in Table 8 and, consistently with the idea that
future meetings should not be related to current outcomes, we ﬁnd that all estimates are very
close to zero and insigniﬁcant.
[TABLE 8]
A second piece of additional evidence addresses the following concern: although the num-
ber of hours together arises from the random allocation process, it might still be that our results
on dispersion and grade crossing are simply the byproduct of the structure of our data. In fact,
pairs with more hours together are more likely than others to have attended courses with the
same teachers and, if teachers are heterogenous, this alone might reduce the variance of out-
comes within pairs. Similarly, there could be cases in which such a reduction in the variance
might also lead to a lower probability of crossing (although one would have to think about some
very special cases of teacher heterogeneity). Note that these concerns bear no implications for
the mean outcome of the pair as a function of the number of meetings.
32To address these issues, in Table 9 we augment equations 24 and 25 with a set of dummies
for the classes assigned to each student in the pair (i;j) in every academic year. Overall, there
are 12 such dummies (one for each of the 8 classes in Management plus 2 classes in Economics
and Economics&Finance) for each student in the pair, for each academic year and each cohort,
for a total of 144 dummies. Such class effects are meant to control for the potential bias due to
unobservable factors at the class level, such as teacher quality, class size or class composition,
that might be partially collinear with mijt. Results are qualitatively identical to those in Table
6 and Table 7. Also the magnitude of the estimates is very comparable, especially for grade
crossing.
[TABLE 9]
The results in the previous section are consistent, within our framework, only with the in-
surance mechanism. As it is well known in the literature (Alvarez & Jermann 2000), the level
of informal insurance between two parties under limited commitment rests on three fundamen-
tal parameters, i.e. risk aversion, discount rate and correlation of shocks, plus the ability of the
parties to monitor and enforce punishment for deviating behaviors. Although we do not directly
observe any of these three parameters, one might think that gender is an important determinant
of the degree of insurance under the assumption that reciprocal trust and monitoring are easier
among same sex pairs.
We explore this idea in Table 10, where we report estimates of equation 25 for samples of
pairs restricted to either same gender (row 1) or mixed gender (row 2) or both females (row 3)
or both males (row 4). Results are remarkably similar across these groups and it only appears
that females have a smaller negative effect on average performance when they interact among
themselves.
[TABLE 10]
In Table 11 we further investigate heterogeneity in ability. Although the level of ability
of a student in a pair should not matter for the degree of sustainable insurance in a pair, it
33is however true that it could determine the sharing rule, i.e. the more able of the pair gets
allocated more time (or resources, our t parameter in the model) in every state of the world
(a higher Pareto weight). Therefore, in order to be consistent with the proposed mechanism,
individual ability (which we measure with the standardized entry test) should be irrelevant for
the relation between our ﬁrst and second moments of the outcomes and the exogenous number
of hours spent together.
Consistently with this interpretation, in Table 11 we ﬁnd that, when estimating equation 25
on subsamples deﬁned by ability quartiles of the two students in each pair, results are extremely
homogeneous, especially as far as mean outcomes are concerned.
[TABLE 11]
5 Alternative Mechanisms
So far we have considered three plausible mechanisms that are able to explain what is com-
monly termed peer effects or social interactions in the literature. However, it might still be
possible that other mechanisms are consistent with our empirical evidence. For example, one
could construct a behavioral model where students get to know each other over time and di-
vert their attention from studying to other more socializing activities (going out, partying, etc.).
Such a mechanism could easily account for the drop in performance but would be hard pressed
to explain the drop in the cross-sectional variance, as each student would be subject to her
own shock. One possible way to adapt such a model to generate lower dispersion in out-
comes consists in introducing some kind of preference for equality or conformity (Douglas B.
Bernheim 1994, Akerlof 1997), whereby students dislike to perform differently from their
friends. In this case students hit by different types of shocks would help each other. This,
however, resembles quite closely our insurance model.
One might think as well that such alternative mechanism is particularly valid for males and
lower ability students, as those students might have a higher inclination to partying. For this
purpose, the evidence presented in the previous Section 4.1 (Tables 10 and 11) is particularly
34informative, as we ﬁnd that the estimated effects are pretty homogeneous both across gender
types and ability combinations. Such a lack of heterogeneity is consistent with insurance, as
the insuring parties would not care about their relative ability but focus on the correlation of
shocks and the ability to implement the informal contract.
Another possibility is that as students know each other better they care more about their
relative performance, in our model this would mean that  is increasing in m. However, as
showninProposition4, ifthatwerethecasethemeanoutcomeshouldincreasewiththenumber
of meeting which is the opposite of what we ﬁnd in the data.
Further, the disruption model of Edward P. Lazear (2001), adequately modiﬁed, might be
able to produce what we observe in the data. However, the Lazear’s model of disruption nat-
urally produces a negative correlation between group size and performance, while our results
in Table 9 are not consistent with such a story. In fact when we control for class identiﬁers,
which capture, among other things, the size of the class, we ﬁnd almost the same results as
those in the main Table 6. Moreover, the simplest disruption model would explain why the
mean performance falls but would have very little to say regarding the cross-sectional variance,
unless some further assumptions are made.
Finally, another alternative model could be one where students exhibit preferences for
equality. Such a model could certainly explain the reduced dispersion in outcomes but it would
generally display multiple equilibria, with students clustering around either high or low per-
formance. There would be no reason for a generalized fall in performance. Furthermore,
preferences for equality would not be enough to explain the observed relationship between the
number of meetings and the average and the dispersion of performance. One would have to
make further assumptions about how a student’s interest for the performance of her friends
varies with time spent together. The evidence in Table 11, seems to further reject such a model,
as even in ex-ante homogenous pairs we have a reduction in performance, while that model
would predict a clustering at a high level or low level, possibly depending on ability.
In general, it is always possible to propose a behavioral model that can explain our em-
pirical ﬁndings (in fact, any empirical ﬁnding) and one possible reading of our contribution
35is precisely the possibility to explain the patter of social interactions on the basis of simple
economic mechanisms, that are relatively standard and well established in the literature.
6 Conclusions
Inthispaperweproposeasetofmodelsofsocialinteractionsthatgeneratetestableimplications
capable of separating them empirically. In particular, we consider three possible mechanisms
of interactions: i. a baseline scenario, where peer effects arise because of reference-based
utility; ii. a model of joint production and; iii. one of mutual insurance against shocks to time
or productivity. While all mechanisms predict a reduction in the dispersion of outcomes within
groups (pairs) - what is commonly termed peer effects -, they differ in their implications for
average performance, which, compared to the benchmark case, increases under cooperation
and decreases with mutual insurance.
We take these simple predictions to the data using information on two cohorts of under-
graduate Bocconi students, where we can exploit random variation in the number of meetings
between students dictated by repeated random allocation into teaching classes. In this setting,
the amount of time any two students spend together in the same lecturing classrooms is ex-
ogenous by deﬁnition and drives the transition from a decentralized model towards a model of
insurance or cooperation. We ﬁnd that the insurance motive dominates.
Such a result has clear policy implications: in order to increase average performance it
would be beneﬁcial to prevent students from sitting in the same class too often. Alternatively,
the university could introduce incentives that limit the possibility to engage in mutual insurance
and encourage cooperation or joint production.
Although we frame our theoretical discussion as well as the empirical application in the
education setting, our analysis is more general and it applies to many different contexts, from
teamwork to academic co-authorship to any environment where social interactions could be im-
portant. For example, if mutual insurance were proven to be the main mechanism of interaction
in team production too, the design of incentive pay schemes, which is one of the fundamental
36issues in that literature, should take into account the possibility that workers may endogenously
react to the introduction of such schemes by engaging in some kind of mutual insurance, thus
undoing the expected effect on effort. Similarly, in the production of academic research people
explicitly interact through co-authorship, although performance evaluation is typically carried
out at the individual level, primarily via tenure decisions but also with the allocation of research
funds and awards. This is also a setting that resembles our model very closely.
In the theoretical discussion we have assumed away agents’ heterogeneity and endoge-
nous group formation. Although such an assumption is consistent with our testing strategy,
where students are randomly allocated to peers (and ﬁxed effects are accounted for), we should
emphasize that one important implication of our results is that an individual may choose dif-
ferent types of peers depending on whether the purpose of the group is cooperation or in-
surance. We also recognize that the process of group formation (Garance Genicot & Debraj
Ray 2003, Ballester, Calv´ o-Armengol & Zenou 2006) is very important and that the interlink
between such process and the choice of the interaction mode should be investigated thoroughly
in future research.
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41Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Distribution of selected variables within groups and in the population
Table 1: Compulsory curricula
Management Economics Econ&Finance
courses hours courses hours courses hours
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Academic year
Year 1 8 464 8 448 8 464
Year 2 7 384 7 432 7 448
Year 3 8 464 4 256 7 384
Total 23 1,312 19 1,136 22 1,296
Number of courses and hours by program. The detailed list of courses is in the
appendix, Table B1.
42Table 2: Students’ characteristics
All students Management Economics Econ&Finance
N=2,406 N=1,713 N=224 N=496
Variable mean mean mean mean
(std.dev.) (std.dev.) (std.dev.) (std.dev.)
1=female 0.415 0.451 0.388 0.299
- - -
1=original residence outside Milana 0.676 0.664 0.638 0.736
- - -
1=highest income bracketb 0.223 0.235 0.246 0.171
- - -
Admission test scorec 65.213 63.702 69.369 68.742
(15.80) (15.54) (16.80) (15.36)
High school leaving graded 89.542 88.721 89.991 92.324
(10.19) (10.30) (10.89) (8.89)
a Coded to 1 if the student’s residence is outside the province of Milan (which is where the university is located).
b Coded to 1 if the student’s household income falls in the highest bracket for the determination of fees.
c Normalized between 0 and 100.
d Normalized between 0 and 100 (pass = 60)
Table 3: Characteristics of the student pairs
Variable All Management Economics Econ&Finance
(Num. of pairs) (800,935) (732,808) (13,161) (54,966)
1=same sex 0.512 0.507 0.521 0.581
1=both males 0.317 0.303 0.372 0.493
1=both females 0.195 0.204 0.149 0.088
1=both from outside Milana 0.449 0.443 0.391 0.538
1=both from Milana 0.113 0.115 0.142 0.072
1=both high incomeb 0.053 0.055 0.056 0.029
1=none high incomeb 0.592 0.586 0.582 0.686
Abs(testi   testj)=testc 0.234 0.236 0.229 0.214
Abs(HSi   HSj)=HSc 0.125 0.127 0.133 0.101
1=ever met 0.375 0.328 0.874 0.873
The table reports the means of the indicated variables.
a Coded to 1 if both student’s residence is inside (outside) the province of Milan (which is where the
university is located).
b Coded to 1 if the household incomes of both (none) students falls in the highest bracket for the
determination of fees.
c The absolute difference in test scores and high school grades between the two students in the pair are
normalized by the average test score and high school grade among all students in the same enrollment
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Table 5: Distribution of hours together
Management Economics Econ&Finance
Meetings % Hours % Hours % Hours
Never 67.16 0 12.61 0 12.71 0
Year 1 9.55 464 12.83 448 12.64 464
Year 2 9.51 384 12.34 432 12.48 448
Year 3 9.52 464 12.46 256 12.38 384
Year 1&Year 2 1.37 848 12.6 880 12.37 912
Year 1&Year 3 1.35 928 12.46 704 12.42 848
Year 2&Year 3 1.35 848 12.37 688 12.58 832
Always 0.19 1312 12.33 1136 12.42 1296
Table 6: Time together and academic outcomes
Mean grade Mean abs. grade difference
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Hours in the same class -0.022 -0.027*** -0.013 -0.012**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
Student pairs’ ﬁxed effects no yes no yes
Observations 2,402,805 1,601,870 2,402,805 1,601,870
Number of pairs 800,935 800,935 800,935 800,935
Both the dependent variables and the explanatory variables are normalized within degree program
and academic year cells. All regressions include academic year dummies. The speciﬁcations in
columns 1 and 3 also include dummies for enrollment cohort and degree program.
The standard errors are three-way clustered at the level of each student in the pair and the
frequency of their meetings.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
45Table 7: The crossing property
1=grade vectors cross
[1] [2]
Hours in the same class -0.002 -0.004***
(0.003) (0.001)
Student pairs’ ﬁxed effects no yes
Observations 2,402,805 1,601,870
Number of pairs 800,935 800,935
The explanatory variables are normalized within degree
program and academic year cells. All regressions include
academic year dummies. The speciﬁcations in column 1 also
includes dummies for enrollment cohort and degree program.
The standard errors are three-way clustered at the level of
each student in the pair and the frequency of their meetings.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%.
Table 8: Placebo regressions
Mean grade Mean abs. grade difference 1=crossing
[1] [2] [3]
1=meet anytime in the future 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Number of pairs 800,935 800,935 800,935
All outcome variables refer to the ﬁrst academic year. Both the dependent variables and the explanatory
variables are normalized within degree program. All regressions include dummies for enrollment
cohort and degree program.
The standard errors are two-way clustered at the level of each student in the pair.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
46Table 9: Robustness check with class effects
Mean abs. grade difference 1=grade vectors cross
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Hours in the same class -0.014* -0.015*** -0.002 -0.004***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Student pairs’ ﬁxed effects no yes no yes
Class ﬁxed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,402,805 1,601,870 2,402,805 1,601,870
Number of pairs 800,935 800,935 800,935 800,935
In columns 1 and 2 both the dependent variables and the explanatory variables are normalized
within degree program and academic year cells. In columns 3 and 4 only the explanatory
variables are normalized. All regressions include academic year dummies. The speciﬁcations in
columns 1 and 3 also include dummies for enrollment cohort and degree program.
The standard errors are three-way clustered at the level of each student in the pair and the
frequency of their meetings.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 10: Heterogeneity of the effects across gender compositions
Mean Grade Mean abs. grade difference Observations
[1] [2] [3]
Gender composition of the pair:
Same sex -0.028** -0.014** 820,334
(0.011) (0.006)
Mixed sex -0.027** -0.011** 781,536
(0.011) (0.005)
Both females -0.014* -0.021** 312,150
(0.008) (0.008)
Both males -0.034*** -0.008 508,184
(0.013) (0.006)
The table reports the ﬁxed-effects estimates of the effect of hours together on the
outcome restricting the sample to type of pairs indicated in the ﬁrst column.
The standard errors are three-way clustered at the level of each student in the pair and
the frequency of their meetings. across the two samples.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
47Table 11: Heterogeneity of the effects across gender composi-
tions
PANEL A: Mean grade
Student i









ﬁrst -0.029** -0.026** -0.028** -0.031**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
- -0.025* -0.024** -0.032***
second - (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
- - -0.022** -0.024**
third - - (0.010) (0.011)
- - - -0.033**
fourth - - - -(0.015)
PANEL B: Mean abs. grade difference
Student i









ﬁrst -0.005 -0.008 -0.014** -0.016**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
second - -0.007 -0.013* -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
third - - -0.016 -0.018***
(0.011) (0.006)
fourth - - - -0.013
(0.008)
The table reports the ﬁxed-effects estimates of the effect of hours
together on the outcome, restricting the sample to pairs of students in the
indicated quartiles of the ability distribution. Ability is measured by the
entry test score. Quartiles ordered in ascending order.
The standard errors are three-way clustered at the level of each student in
the pair and the frequency of their meetings.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
48Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
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@ej , it must be that
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(1   ) > 1 +
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which is impossible with  < 1.
Proof of proposition 2.
Proof. Subtracting the ﬁrst order conditions in equations 10 and 11 from each
others yields:
















Proof for proposition 3.




d must have the
same sign. Take the total differential of the ﬁrst order conditions in equations 10




































d have different signs. Second, we
show that
dei
d > 0 (or alternatively that
dej
d > 0). Combining the two ﬁrst order



































































which is in fact positive.
Proof of proposition 4.
Proof. The ﬁrst result (
E(x)
@  0) comes immediately from the fact that both ei
and ej increase with . To ﬁnd the sufﬁcient conditions under which
CV (x)
@  0,


































@ej , which implies
that the necessary condition to have
dCV (x)
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 the more likely that
dCV (x)
d < 0. In particular, it can
be shown that if
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d . In fact, the sufﬁcient condition to have
dCV (x)
d < 0 essentially states that
@3f()
@3ea must be positive and large enough:
@3f()






d > 0 (A10)
Proof of proposition 5.
Proof. i) By contradiction, suppose eC
i < eD
i and look at how the ﬁrst order





















i , the LHS of this equation would be negative and the RHS would be
positive, which is impossible. Hence, it must be that eC
i > eD




ii) given i) and the complementarity assumption.
Proof of proposition 6.























Take the total differential of xC
i  xC
j from this expression when eD
i increases to eC
i
and eD


















































which, given that dei > 0, dej > 0,
@2g(ei;ej)
@2ei < 0 and
@2g(ei;ej)
@ei@ej > 0, is negative.
Proof of proposition 7.
Proof. Simply comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the insurance model in
equation 19 and the decentralization model in equations 10 or 11 shows that eI <
eD
i . It, then, follows that E(xI) < E(xD) < E(xC). Under full insurance the
performance of both students is identical, hence CV (xI) = 0.
51Appendix B Additional empirical results
52Table B1: Academic Structure
Degree program Year Courses Hours Subject area
Management First year Management I 64 Management
Accounting I 48 Management
Management II 64 Management
Microeconomics 64 Economics
Mathematics 80 Quantitative
Private Law 64 Law
Public Law 32 Law
Economic History 48 Other
Second year Accounting II 64 Management
Public management 32 Management
Organization theory 64 Management
Macroeconomics 64 Economics
Statistics 64 Quantitative
Mathematics for Finance 32 Quantitative
Commercial Law 64 Law
Third year Marketing 64 Management
Innovation management 64 Management
Corporate finance 64 Management
Managerial accounting 64 Management
Management of informational systems 32 Management
Strategic management 64 Management
Economics of financial markets 64 Economics
Public Economics 48 Economics




Private Law 64 Law
Private Law 32 Law
Economic history 48 Other
Sociology 48 Other
Second year Management II 64 Management
Economics of financial markets 48 Economics
Economic analysis 64 Economics
Macroeconomics 64 Economics
Mathematics for economics 64 Quantitative
Statistics 64 Quantitative
Commercial law 64 Law
Third year Public Economics 64 Economics
International economic policy 64 Economics
Data analysis 64 Quantitative
Econometrics 64 Quantitative
Econ&Finance First year Management I 64 Management
Accounting 48 Management
Economics of financial intermediation 64 Economics
Microeconomics 64 Economics
Mathematics 80 Quantitative
Private Law 64 Law
Public Law 32 Law
Economic History 48 Other
Second year Securities market 64 Economics
Macroeconomics 64 Economics
Monetary economics 64 Economics
Public economics 64 Economics
Statistics 64 Quantitative
Mathematics for finance 64 Quantitative
Commercial law 64 Law
Third year Management II 64 Management
Corporate finance 64 Management
International monetary economics 48 Economics
Applied economics 48 Economics
Global banking 48 Economics
Banking 64 Economics
Financial market law 48 Law
53Cohort: 2000 2001
Year: first second third first second third
Economics
Class 1&2 0.327 0.479 0.774 0.93 0.704 0.477
Econ&Finance
Class 1&2 0.55 0.757 0.804 0.627 0.276 0.888
Management
2000 first year
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.401 0.982 0.537 0.293 0.591 0.885 0.721
2 . 0.683 0.978 0.307 0.413 0.738 0.256
3 . . 0.853 0.495 0.818 0.898 0.902
4 . . . 0.386 0.792 0.847 0.602
5 . . . . 0.483 0.325 0.456
6 . . . . . 0.968 0.643
7 . . . . . . 0.943
2000 second year
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.578 0.037 0.291 0.053 0.397 0.686 0.176
2 . 0.193 0.287 0.192 0.674 0.947 0.64
3 . . 0.057 0.986 0.567 0.197 0.249
4 . . . 0.068 0.303 0.522 0.425
5 . . . . 0.479 0.201 0.306
6 . . . . . 0.497 0.61
7 . . . . . . 0.535
2000 third year
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.53 0.342 0.41 0.905 0.862 0.32 0.353
2 . 0.971 0.991 0.823 0.912 0.868 0.096
3 . . 1 0.632 0.864 0.822 0.127
4 . . . 0.6 0.824 0.924 0.188
5 . . . . 0.93 0.223 0.361
6 . . . . . 0.381 0.253
7 . . . . . . 0.061
2001 first year
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.985 0.781 0.122 0.439 0.161 0.345 0.763
2 . 0.525 0.304 0.77 0.432 0.282 0.902
3 . . 0.133 0.389 0.156 0.329 0.13
4 . . . 0.808 0.631 0.009 0.253
5 . . . . 0.574 0.041 0.571
6 . . . . . 0.027 0.352
7 . . . . . . 0.09
2001 second year
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.707 0.099 0.419 0.107 0.538 0.286 0.106
2 . 0.426 0.347 0.498 0.863 0.835 0.669
3 . . 0.091 0.221 0.854 0.281 0.355
4 . . . 0.607 0.271 0.295 0.093
5 . . . . 0.228 0.549 0.367
6 . . . . . 0.905 0.545
7 . . . . . . 0.637
2001 third year
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.377 0.352 0.796 0.21 0.709 0.879 0.994
2 . 0.652 0.542 0.542 0.842 0.483 0.871
3 . . 0.157 0.644 0.4 0.304 0.419
4 . . . 0.348 0.772 0.951 0.938
5 . . . . 0.132 0.363 0.438
6 . . . . . 0.585 0.922
7 . . . . . . 0.75
Table B2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of the distribution of test scores across classes.
The table reports the p-values of pairwise Klomogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of the distributions of entry test scores in all 
available pairs of classes within the same cohort-degree program-academic year cells.
54Table B3: Number of students and student pairs
Degree Cohort
program 1999-2000 2000-2001 Total
Panel A: Number of students
Management 865 848 1,713
Economics 139 85 224
Econ&Finance 249 220 469
Total 1,253 1,153 2,406
Panel B: Number of pairs
Management 373,680 359,128 732,808
Economics 9,591 3,570 13,161
Econ&Finance 30,876 24,090 54,966
Total 414,147 386,788 800,935
55Appendix C Extensions to the model
Appendix C.1 Strategic Interactions
We consider in this section the possibility of strategic interactions in our set-up. For this pur-
pose, we revisit the equilibria under decentralization, joint production and full insurance, as-
suming that each student in the pair internalizes the effect of one’s effort on peer’s effort.
Decentralization. With strategic behavior, the ﬁrst order conditions of equations 10 and 11
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i indicated the optimal effort level of agent i (or j) under decentralization with strate-
gic behavior.
It is, then, easy to see that eDS
a < eD
a ;8i;j. We can also prove a modiﬁed version of
Proposition 1, that takes strategic behavior into account. The proof proceeds analogously to the
one of Proposition 1 by contradiction.23
Joint Production Under joint production higher effort from one of the agents increases
the productivity of the other, who will then also increase effort, which in turn improves one’s
productivity. Hence, in this framework there are two offsetting externalities: on the one hand
higher effort from one’s peer raises the reference point, thus lowering utility, on the other hand
it improves productivity. The overall effect, compared to the non-strategic equilibrium, de-
pends on the functional forms. Nevertheless, the externality in the utility function is common
to all mechanisms so that, when comparing the distributions of the outcomes across mecha-
nisms within the strategic framework, only the production externality matters. Hence, since
the production externality unambiguously induces higher effort, compared to decentralization
or insurance where complementarity is ruled out, in a strategic equilibrium the implications on
the mean outcome is reinforced. The same holds for dispersion, as the agent hit by the negative
shock beneﬁts more from the complementarity than the other.
Eventually, a modiﬁed version of Proposition 5 would still hold with eCS
a  eDS
a ; 8a = i;j,
while the relationship between eCS
a and eC
a depends on functional form assumptions (where eCS
a
is the optimal effort level of agent a under joint production with strategic behavior).
Full Insurance. In the full insurance scenario with strategic interactions the results are
also in line with those presented in the main text. If we take the ﬁrst order conditions in section










23Notice that in this framework existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium depend on the speciﬁc functional
forms. However, conditional on the equilibrium existence and uniqueness, the modiﬁed version of Proposition 1
can be proven.




@ea > 0 8a = i;j:, then eIS < eI. It is then immediate to show that, even with
strategic interactions, the level of effort is lowest under full insurance compared to any of the
other mechanisms.
Appendix C.2 Social Planner
The results derived in the main text and the proofs of Appendix A assume that, in the joint
production scenario, the two agents take each other’s actions as given, while still producing
jointly. This might be a questionable assumption, which, however, does not fundamentally
change our results but simpliﬁes the mathematical conditions and proofs. In what follows we
show that, even when we consider a social planner equilibrium in the joint production scenario
(i.e. an equilibrium that fully internalizes the externalities), the main implications of our simple
model still stand.
We present this analysis with the help of simulations, since the set of necessary and sufﬁ-
cient conditions under this particular allocation are more cumbersome than those in the main
text. Foreaseofcomparisonweshowthesimulationresultsforthethreeproposedmechanisms:
i. decentralization; ii. joint production (planner’s problem) and iii. full insurance, where in the
joint production scenario we solve the programming problem under a social planner.
The simulation results we report in this section are based upon the following parametric
assumptions on the production functions:
f(ea) = tae











with 0 <  <  < 1 to preserve standard properties of the production function. We solve
for the equilibria under the assumption that  = :6,  = :5,  = :95, and  = :5 while we let
the magnitude of the shock vary between a minor shock of 1% of the time endowment and a
large shock of 15% of the individual endowment.
Figure C1 shows that the allocations that we obtain from this simulation mimic those pre-
sented in the main text. In fact, no matter the magnitude of the shock, the average performances
(upper panel) can still be ranked in ascending order, with full insurance yielding the lowest
level, followed by decentralization and, then, the joint production case. As one would expect,
average performance decreases with the magnitude of the shock. Also, the results on dispersion
(middle panel) do not differ from those in the main text. In choosing the mechanism one would
have to look at the utility comparison as in the bottom panel of Figure C1, where we also take
into account the cost of producing jointly c(m) or insurance h(m) ﬁxed at two arbitrary levels
for the graphical representation. In this latter ﬁgure one can notice that the sum of utilities,
in this particular scenario, suggests that, depending on the magnitude of the shock, one would
move from decentralization to joint production to full insurance as the shock becomes bigger.
57Figure C1: Simulation results
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